1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 103.
-3-subjects are then isolated, excised or otherwise managed in ways that further state interests. These Others, having had a subjectivity crafted for them by the state -usually by law -find themselves both assuming a marginalized identity and dissenting from government regulation or discipline in ways that are worth marking as different from that of the more common political dissenter. These outlaws, once marginalized, can be useful to state actors in managing periods of stress to the state, or dangerous times. In dangerous times, as in all other times, governance necessarily includes the creation of a range of governable subjects. In this essay, I discuss several circumstances in which the production of sexual outlaws proves to be a convenient method of managing periods of public, if not state, stress.
Even in periods when a nation can be understood to be taking significant steps toward expanding freedom, when fundamental reforms are undertaken to materialize a break with a prior ignoble regime, and when the story of a nation conforms to a liberal narrative of progress away from unfreedom and toward greater autonomy and equality, we can see the state anxiously managing stress and deploying technologies of governance that inscribe certain types of governable subjects and then disciplining their dissent.
We all know by now that sex is an especially dense transfer point for power.
1 Dangerous times teach us how these transfer points become key to the exercise of state power and control. In this essay, I examine how sex and sexuality can be used by the state during significant moments of transition, as well as periods of state formation and reformation, both in identifying danger and as a tactic of governance. In this essay I examine three instances when sex and sexuality have been particularly useful to the project of managing political instability or transition. These examples illustrate how under some circumstances, in response to transitional stress, the state gains an official sexuality, sources of threat are sexualized, and the management of sex becomes a tool of governance that produces individual unfreedom in the name of expanding national freedom or independence. In each of these examples, an antagonism is set up between the interests of the nation and those of the outlaw, who ultimately assumes the role of dissenter. When set up in this manner, the singular must yield to the many.
First, I look at the sexual politics of rule of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has found the deployment of sex as a particularly useful wedge issue in his mission of national freedomthat is, freedom from colonial rule by the British. Mugabe has effectively undertaken brutally homophobic policies by framing them within a post colonial story that has enormous purchase with his
people. Yet driving this deployment of a homophobic anti-imperialist progrom has been a shrewd plan to disempower a rapidly growing civil society in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's repressive campaigns attacking homosexuals have supported an ever radiating set of attacks against women, political opponents and white farmers. One way to read this trajectory is to see that the assault on homosexuality was the entry point in the creation of a culture of intolerance. Here, as elsewhere, sex has been looked to as a particularly useful transfer point for the consolidation of post colonial power.
Next I turn to Egypt and recent government-led campaigns of highly public and publicized criminal prosecutions of men alleged to be gay. It is tempting to read these public spectacles as events similar to those being undertaken in east African nations: the Egyptian government bluntly demonstrating its Islamic credentials to a domestic and pan Arab audience, and in so doing, consolidating its own
power. Yet, closer examination reveals that these show trials emerged as part of an ongoing post colonial struggle within Egypt that began in the 1930s with the repeal of British colonial laws licensing prostitution. Against this history, a set of homosexual social and legal subjects have been created by the Mubarak government, and once so formed and disciplined, "human rights" rides into the rescue to liberate these perversely formed dissenters from social and legal discipline. The (invited?) assistance of the international human rights establishment has further reinforced post colonial nationalist rhetoric that located individual rights as a Western norm that threatens to undermine authentic African culture.
Finally, I turn to the United States in the period immediately following the civil war, when the federal government undertook two enormously challenging tasks: reunifying the nation after a devastating civil war, and managing the transition of African Americans from enslavement to citizenship.
Having identified itself with the fundamental values of freedom and equality, in contradistinction to the vanquished confederate states, the federal government demonstrated its commitment to these values in and through the way it managed the project of civilizing freed men and women. Remarkably, however, the practices of freedom undertaken by the federal government in the immediate post war period were focused, not entirely, but quite prominently, on the regulation of freed men and women's sexual practices. A long-denied right to marry was awarded to African Americans immediately upon emancipation, however this new domain of freedom was soon revealed to be more a test administered by the state than a trump to be wielded against state infringement of individual autonomy. Successful participation in and compliance with the rules of the institution of marriage were the grounds upon which freed men and women were to prove that they deserved to be treated as citizens.
2 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 22. 3 An essay plumbing the relationship between nationalism and sexuality in the United States could surely look to the persecution of homosexuality during the 1950's. I chose, instead, to focus on the late 19th century and the experiences of African Americans largely because their experiences have been underdocumented, and I saw little benefit in rehearsing the very good work already done by others on the homophobia of the McCarthy period. See e.g. John D'Emilio, "The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America," in Making Trouble: Essays on Gay History, Politics, and the University (New York: Routledge, 1989 -7-wedge issue that introduces a climate of intolerance by a state seeking to frustrate the growth of civil society (Zimbabwe); ii) as a structural component of post-colonial nation building (Egypt); or iii) to control and subordinate a population even when undertaken in the name of freedom for that same population (freed men and women in U.S. reconstruction). These sexual outlaws then find themselves both positioned as and drawn to the role of dissenter -resisting the process by which their subjugation has rendered them internal enemies of the state.
Comparative work of this kind always poses the risk of over-simplifying complex social histories and genealogies, if not worse, skimming to achieve coherence across cultures and times. I do not profess to be a scholar of either of the two non-U.S. examples I provide here, others are far more familiar with the double histories of nationalism and sexuality in Egypt 6 and Zimbabwe 7 . I offer this comparative analysis for the limited purpose of illuminating how at key moments, and in three very different sites, the nation is imagined is ways that depend upon an interesting interdependence between national and sexual alterity. While Mugabe had always used racial and political differences to establish the authenticity and authority of his government, in 1995 he nominated a new threat to the identity of integrity of Zimbabwean society: homosexuality. Against a backdrop of escalating political, social and economic chaos, in 1995 Mugabe began a public campaign against lesbians and gay men, actively encouraging the national press to report negatively on issues relating to homosexuality, and speaking out himself in ways that invited violence against gay men and lesbians.
I. Disciplinary Administration of African National Sexual Citizenship in Post
14 That year he ordered the Zimbabwe International Book Fair to ban an exhibit by the civil rights group, Gays & Lesbians of Zimbabwe.
Lesbians and gay men were "sexual perverts" who are "lower than dogs and pigs", claimed Mugabe.
He warned homosexuals to leave the country "voluntarily" or face "dire consequences." Soon afterwards, Mugabe urged the public to track down and arrest lesbians and gay men. Since these incitements, men and women perceived to be gay or lesbian have been beaten up, fire-bombed, arrested, interrogated and threatened with death. 15 Mugabe justified these remarks on the ground that homosexuality is "un-African", describing it as "coming from so-called developed nations," labelling 16 Phillips, "Zimbabwean Law and the Production of a White Man's Disease," p. 481.
-11-homosexuality "a white problem." Surely, none of his domestic or international troubles could be traced back to same-sex sexual practices, yet Mugabe devoted considerable time and vitriol to the "problem" of gay people in Zimbabwe, and many observers, both domestically and internationally, held the view that Mugabe unleashed such homophobic vitriol as a way to distract attention away from the government's growing economic and political problems. Of course, the growth in visibility of lesbians and gays in Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s provides some explanation for why Mugabe chose this group at this time to vilify in such a public way.
What is more, the aggressive imposition, if not, invention of traditional and authentic
Zimbabwean culture through the assertion of heterosexuality arose at a time in which Zimbabwe had lost a normative antipodal anchor against which it had asserted its own superior identity: Apartheid South Africa. Prior to 1991, "not only did the apartheid government provide Zimbabwe with an external military, economic and political threat on which to focus, but it presented the Zimbabwean government with a moral high ground easily occupied. Both of these factors provided a moral-political impetus and a certain cohesion to government and society in a newly liberated Zimbabwe, as well as sometimes excusing or distracting from internal problems." 16 The dissolution of apartheid in Zimbabwe's neighbor to the south withdrew the specter of an evil empire with which to contrast Mugabe's civic, African and political virtue.
By the mid 1990's, members of the ruling ZANU PF party in parliament spoke out against "the evil and iniquitous practice of homosexualism and lesbianism." One party member declared, "I would 17 BBC News, August 12, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/audiovideo/programmes /crossing_continents/newsid_143000/143169.stm. 18 Phillips summarizes these traditions in "Zimbabwean Law and the Production of a White Man's Disease," p. 474. 19 Phillips, "Constituting the Global Gay," p. 24. 20 Phillips, "Zimbabwean Law and the Production of a White Man's Disease," p. 475.
-12-like to call for all traditional forces in this country to rally behind the State President in the eradication of homosexualism. I feel that all those who know homos in this country should make them be brought before the courts of law and be tried for their evil activity." Border Gezi, the governor of Mashonaland Central Province, declared that gays and lesbians have "something wrong in their heads" and that homosexuality is completely alien to Zimbabwean culture. "They have no right to practice homosexuality in our country," he says. "If they don't like it, they can leave." 17 To cap it all off, in 1998, the Mugabe government successfully prosecuted the former President Canaan Banana for sodomy.
Of course, Mugabe's assertion of authentic African heterosexuality dissolves under the slightest pressure. Not only was there a broad array of same sex sexual practices between men in the precolonial period, 18 but the notion that human beings possessed a sexuality, such that it could be organized into homo and hetero sexualities, was itself an artifact of British colonial rule. 19 Prior to the civilizing missions of the colonial occupation in Rhodesia, human sexuality was understood in reproductive terms that were constitutive of kinship networks and familial wealth. The reproduction of patrilineal order was the organizing force behind human sexuality, not sexual identity of object choice framed in terms of desire. "What was important was consequential physical activity rather than projected cognitive desire." 20 Thus, the Mugabe government's assertion of an authentic, pre-colonial 21 Phillips, "Zimbabwean Law and the Production of a White Man's Disease," pp. 476-77; International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, "Action Alert, Anti-Gay Rhetoric Escalates in Zimbabwe," (January 1996) available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/world/africa/Zimbabwe1996Jan_2.html. 22 Phillips, "Constituting the Global Gay: Issues of Individual Subjectivity and Sexuality in Southern Africa," p. 31.
-13-African sexuality presupposes an approach to sexuality that has no African roots, and the campaign against gay people in Zimbabwe was undertaken, in significant part, through the enforcement of, if not merely reference to, laws criminalizing homosexuality that had been enacted by the British during colonial rule.
21
While homo sex existed in Zimbabwe prior to Mugabe's strategic interpellation of a gay threat, "he has introduced the word and concept of a 'sexuality' into a previously virginal public discourse; he has been a virulent propagandist for the whole concept of a binary division, where those boundaries were previously blurred. This is not to suggest that Zimbabwe is now flooded with self-identified samesex lovers -it is simply to suggest that he has participated in the constitution of a new identity -one that is individualised, sexualised, and in this form, historically marginalised. Further, by publicising his homophobia President Mugabe has given an identity to many who were previously ignorant of or uncaring about it."
22 Most significant, for present purposes, Mugabe has creating a constituency of marginalized dissenters who have looked to international human rights as a source of protection from government policies. GALZ's claims that its members should enjoy a right to protection against sexual orientation-based discrimination has been put to good use by Mugabe, who has used nationalism to frame the interests of Zimbabwean people, in contrast to the "individual freedom" of perverts and 23 The rights of the singular must yield to the interests of the collectivity.
Human rights activists have critiqued the Mugabe government's attacks on homosexuality as a means to distract attention away from the nation's political and economic problems. So too, this campaign has been interpreted through a post colonial lens, playing to black Zimbabweans' notions of authentic African sexuality and identifying gayness with other imperialist threats in the form of the World Bank, white landowners and other Rhodesian residue. The perversity of the way in which homosexuality has been used by Mugabe in connection with his larger political projects is no better exemplified than his accusation that the British Government had set "gay gangsters" on him over his land reforms. 24 Mugabe thus sets himself up as a besieged African leader being undermined by the (gay)
hand of a prior colonial power, while he tries to restore land to his black (male) constituents. Mugabe has effectively turned to sexuality to produce a normal heterosexual citizen set off against a gay threat to
Zimbabwean society in such a way that "'relations of subjugation can produce subjects,' defined by their varied transgressions as "internal enemies' of society and state." 25 These internal enemies have served as the antipodal point against which Mugabe's Zimbabwe can define itself by reference to what it is not.
In some ways, what concerns human rights workers the most is the dexterity with which
Mugabe has used the attacks on gay people as a stepping stone for broader attacks on his rivals and Review 1&2, p. 217. 33 "We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay a cent for the soil." "Zimbabwe Women Fight to Put Gender on the Land Agenda," The Guardian, January 6, 1999.
-17-from her home by her father's second wife's son, and it has had devastating implications for women in Zimbabwe given that 70 per cent of the agricultural labor force in Zimbabwe are women who work on the soil but cannot own land in their own right.
Mugabe moved on from there when he invited violence against his political opposition, 32 supported extrajudicial seizure of lands owned by white farmers 33 and defended the violence perpetrated against both the white farm owners and their black farm employees. In the wake of these escalating tactics, the Zimbabwean human rights community has become severely weakened and fractured.
Mugabe has demonstrated how effective it can be for a government under enormous pressure to create a climate of intolerance and lawlessness by starting with sexual minorities and working out from there to the rest of civil society. As Scott Long has observed about various Southern African 34 Scott Long, "Fundamentalist Sex: Sexuality, Privacy, and the State in a Global Economy," (2002)(draft on file with author).
35 R. Radhakrishnan "Nationalism, Gender and Narrative," in Nationalisms and Sexualities, p. 84. 36 Ibid.
-18-leaders, "the government used the spectre of sexual perversion to discredit the whole of civil society." 34 Just as "nationalist rhetoric makes 'women' the pure and ahistorical signifier of 'interiority'" 35 it strategically renders sexual pervert as the ur subject of exteriority. While "'woman' becomes the mute but necessary allegorical ground for the transactions of nationalist history," 36 gayness comes into focus not as ground but as figure -as other -whose assimilation into the whole is regard as a threat to the nation.
In Zimbabwe, the state has gained an official sexuality free from colonial contamination, threats to the ruling regime have become sexualized, and sexual discipline is revealed to be a very effective tool of governance for a state in dangerous times. All of this has produced a precinct of dissenting sexual outlaws, congealed into the constituency-based GALZ, whose job it is to give voice to that dissent.
II. The Moral Enclosure of Sexual Threats in Egypt
In May 2001, 52 men in Cairo, Egypt were arrested for suspected consensual same sex sexual acts. They were tried before an Egyptian Emergency State Security Court on charges of obscene behavior and contempt for religion, as Egyptian law does not explicitly criminalize homosexual conduct. -19-suspension of a range of civil and political rights. 37 An unprecedented state-sponsored media campaign publicized the arrests and trials of the accused -their names, places of work and, in some cases, pictures were published in the state owned media. 38 The accused were arrested in the early hours of May 11, 2001, following a raid by police and State Security Intelligence personnel on a party held aboard the Queen Boat, moored on the Nile in Cairo's Zamalek district. Initial reports in the Egyptian media suggested that those arrested were part of a "Satanic cult" and that they were being held under charges of "exploiting religion to promote extreme ideas to create strife and belittle the revealed religions." It subsequently became clear that the arrests were carried out because the men were suspected of engaging in consensual sexual activity with other men. The detainees were subjected to forensic examinations, apparently in order to determine whether they had engaged in anal intercourse. 39 In November, 2001, the defendants were brought into court and were promptly placed in a cage in the courtroom where they stood wearing masks and hoods they had constructed out of their shirts and underwear in order to disguise their identities from the media present in the court. Indeed, only the media was allowed in the courtroom when the judge read out the verdicts and sentences, families and friends of the accused were not permitted to be present, and their cries from the hall and banging on the courtroom doors rumbled in the courtroom as the judge began 40 International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, "Action Alert, 23 Presumed Homosexuals Sentenced to Hard Labor," available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/world/africa/Egypt2001Nov_2.html (2001). 41 International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, "Action Alert: Cairo 52 Acquitted Men Back In Court," available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/world/africa/Egypt2002Jun_2.html, (2002). 42 Bahgat, "Explaining Egypt's Targeting of Gays," p. 2.
-20-the proceedings. The judge read the court's verdict in a whisper that no one in the room could hear, indeed many defendants did not know whether they had been found guilty or what sentence they had been given for some days.
In the end, twenty three of the fifty two defendants were sentenced to between one and five years of hard labor. 40 However, in May, 2002 the State Security Office for the Ratification of Verdicts overturned most of the Cairo 52 convictions and released 21 of the men who had been found guilty of the "habitual practice of debauchery." The court took this action on the ground that this crime did not merit trial before the special emergency court, and ordered that these men, as well as those who had been acquitted in the Cairo 52 trial, be retried in a civilian court.
41
How to understand these very public scandalous show trials undertaken by the Egyptian government in the press, the Emergency Security Court, and now Egyptian civil courts? As in Zimbabwe, some have observed that the Mubarak government desired to divert public attention away from economic problems and a growing liquidity crisis while the government attempted to impose new sales taxes. 42 One could also imagine that the government had ample reason to shore up its Islamic credentials domestically as it found itself increasingly allied with the U.S. government in its campaign against terrorism. Scandalous sex trials might do the trick. Some human rights groups have interpreted 43 Bruce Dunne, Sexuality and the "Civilizing Process" in Modern Egypt, unpublished dissertation, (Georgetown University, 1996), pp. 195-252. were punished with the death penalty. 54 The well publicized prosecution of the Cairo 52 in these same courts sends a message to an international audience that the courts do not exist exclusively to harass and persecute the religious opposition. Indeed, these courts can be used to prosecute the very groups that the Islamists hate the most.
What is more, in recent years of national economic contraction, Islamic groups have stepped in Although condemned abroad, the trial of the 'Cairo 52' has met with nearly universal approval at home." 58 In Egypt, as in Zimbabwe, the moral enclosure of sex -be it heterosexuality within monogamous marriage, prostitution or homosex -has proven to be an effective tool of governance by a state under stress. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, same sex sex between males was well know and wide spread in Egypt. But only the passive partner (constructed within the context of anal sex) was considered to be homosexual and was subject to criminal laws prohibiting homosexual acts. 59 Curiously, this definition of homosexuality has changed in recent years. Through the Cairo 52
prosecutions, the government has demonstrated the adoption of a more "western" identity-based definition of gayness. Role no longer defines the crime, sex of object choice does -and this is new in Muslim society. Thus, at the moment that the Egyptian government has chosen to use (homo)sex to consolidate and rehabilitate its power, it has done so by first interpellating a western homosexual subject, and then caging him, parading him before the public, and excising him from Egyptian culture.
The moral enclosure in which these gay outlaws in Egypt have been caged reflects a kind of 60 Foreign nationals who were picked up were released and not charged. Here, as in Zimbabwe, "internal enemies" have been located within the political horizon of the state -not from without as would have been the case with foreign prostitutes or residual colonialists.
So too, sexual accusation has supplied the mechanism of justification by which qualities deemed undesirable may be contained or excised. These domestic enemies emerge first as an abstract legal category "the sodomite" or "the pervert habituated to debauchery," that is to be filled up with bodiesreally, any bodies -through an act of nominal violence with profound epistemic effects. "You, and you and you," commands the state as it arrests Egyptian men 60 off the street, often randomly. Through these public acts of law enforcement, sex is stamped on male bodies in an act whereby qualities deemed undesirable may be contained or excised through sexual accusation by the post colonial state in its attempts to define an idealized nation. Five women all Mothers, and the residue of 29 children, all small and under 12 years of age.
One of the Women had the small pox, her face a perfect mass of Scabs, her children were left uncared for except for what they incidentally [received] . Another woman was nursing a little boy about 7 whose earthly life was fast ebbing away, she could pay but little attention to the rest of her family. Another was scarcely able to crawl about.
They had no bedding. Two old quilts and a soldiers old worn out blanket comprised the whole for 35 human beings. I enquired how they slept, they collect together to keep one another warm and then throw the quilts over them. There is no wood for them nearer than half a mile which these poor children have to toat as they could carry, hence they have a poor supply and the same with water, this has be carried the same distance and the only vessel they had to carry it in was a heavy 2 gallon stone jug, a load for a child when empty.
They owned One Pan, and one Iron kettle amongst them, they had no tin cup, no crockery of any kind, no knives or forks, and certainly were the poorest off, of any I have met with being litterally and truthfully destitute in every sense of the word.
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Mississippi (1864) (containing a report dated Dec. 17, 1863, describing the destitute conditions of freedmen throughout Mississippi).
-31-This description was not atypical of the living conditions of the formally enslaved people who had escaped behind Union lines.
As the federal government deliberated over how to handle the sizable population of freed men and women, virtually all of whom were in desperate need of material aid, a key decision was made with respect to meeting that need. The needs of freed men and women, as well as the structure for their transition from enslavement to citizen, would be met not by providing them with material resources (such as land, food, or reparations), but by providing them with rights. In the end, law not land is what U.S. government felt the freedmen needed most. And that's what they got -lots of it. "Freedom" delivered cold comfort to those formerly enslaved people who sought the aid of federal officers at the end of the war.
Thus legal status, not material resources, was used to address the transition from enslavement to freedom for African American people. In this case, rights operated not only as the frame within which freed men and women were to exercise their new-found freedom, but also as a political horizon: "the just society." The Bureau Agents were there to define what these rights meant, and what obligations they imposed on freed men and women.
In the face of the overwhelming human suffering, illness and desperation that African American people presented when they sought refuge in contraband camps, Northern officials' first response was not to deliver food and shelter, but to insist that all adult couples be married, and that traditional family 78 Married African American men in South Carolina were forced by the state to support their families, and if they failed to do so, were subject to a judge forcibly binding them to work for renewable year terms--usually in the service of former slave owners. A South Carolina law provided that
[a] husband, not disabled, who has been thus convicted of having abandoned or turned away his wife, or has been shown to fail in maintaining his wife and children, may be bound to service by the district judge, from year to year, and so much of the profits of his labor as may be requisite applied to the maintenance of his wife and children. -35-southern state prisons with black male bodies who could be leased out to white planters at rock bottom prices in order to perform the agricultural work previously performed by slaves.
80 This is what freedom looked like for many black men in the post bellum south: performing the same work for the same white landowner as you had while enslaved, but as a fungible leased resource rather than a prized owned asset.
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Of course, it would be naive to understand state power in a context such as this as acting upon an undifferentiated mass of natives who are domesticated through a simple Althusserian form of call and response: the law beckons and you either answer the call as husband or wife, or refuse it at the price of prosecution for fornication or bigamy. Either way the law wins under this account, and the native is acted on as the object of the state's disciplinary power.
In the post bellum period, as in most other colonial encounters, the domesticating power of law renders agency and resistence a much more complicated story. Imperialist power is working at its best when the native is domesticated by internalizing, or self-inscribing imperialist scripts and legal norms such that the object of imperial control becomes subject to its own self-discipline. 82 Colonialism's power to cultivate self-governance in those to be governed takes place through a set of tactics of inscription that bring into existence the kind of social and legal subjects over which the state seeks to 83 Nikolas Rose nicely assembles Althusserian notions of interpellation, Foucaldian concepts of discipline and various post colonial approaches to the production of native subjectivity in his concept of inscription devices. Rose, Powers of Freedom, p.37.
-36-command control, such as husbands, wives and fornicators. 83 The evidence contained in the original indictments and prosecutions of African Americans in the immediate post bellum period indicate that criminal discipline imposed for violations of marriage laws, in many cases, were not initiated by white Northerners, or, for that matter, white Southerners. Rather, adultery, bigamy and fornication laws were being enforced largely from within the African American community. In Mississippi, for instance, quite often the indictment and accusatory affidavits were initiated by African American women against their husbands who had taken up with someone else. In Granville County, North Carolina, there was a spate of prosecutions against African American couples for fornication and adultery, and the principle witnesses on all the indictments were Willis and Chaney
Chandler, a black couple who, census data reveals, were neighbors of the people they turned in to the authorities for living in sin. However, 9 months later, Willis and Chaney were turned over to the local prosecutor by their neighbors for fornication -it seems they too were not legally married.
The women of Granville County also made extraordinary use of a legal procedure relating to bastardy. If a woman was not married to the father of her child, she could go to court and get an order naming him as the legal father, and then, ideally, obtain a court order of child support. Typically, the order of paternity would issue on the word of the woman alone. The Granville County records show such a large number of bastardy petitions filed by women, mostly black women, that at one point they opened up a special bastardy court that met on Saturdays and heard only these petitions. Curiously, however, very few of the cases resulted in an award of support -by and large the men were never served nor appeared in court as they had most likely left the county when they heard that their names appeared on a warrant. Notwithstanding the fact that these petitions resulted in very few orders of paternity or awards of child support, women continued to file them in great numbers -and the only significant legal or material consequence was that a legal document had been filed in court in which the women had admitted that their children were bastards.
How are we to understand the legal subjectivity of African American's when they go down to City Hall to register their marriages, turn to the local sheriff to prosecute their husbands for adultery, or file bastardy petitions against the fathers of their children? What sort of epistemic overhaul does this transition from enslavement to freedom signify? Are they social protagonists, or "good blacks" whose conformance to Reconstruction expectations of citizenship marks out a zone between those who are passing as citizens and those who aren't? Is there any room for agency in this account of citizenship, rights and interpellation? Can we understand African American's use of rights as a kind of mimicry or pastiche, the contains, or better yet, reveals within it a resisting subject?
There may be a plausible way to understand African American's resort to law and rights as something other than passive interpellation. In this sense, Homi Bahbha's notion of ambivalency is helpful -for the role of law is not only the imposition of the rule of law, for surely it was resorted to strategically by freed men and women in this period. While we can't know this for sure, I have a very strong suspicion that a good number of the women in Vicksburg, Mississippi who resorted to legal authorities to get their husbands back in the house were doing so in order to avoid having their children 84 Parents of black children found themselves powerless to protect their children from an oppressive child apprentice system. Judges were permitted to bind to white employers those children whose parents were determined to be unable to support them. "To blacks, such apprenticeships represented nothing less than a continuation of slavery." Foner (1988): 201. The laws empowering judges to remove children from their parents, often after they had just been reunited at the end of slavery, "came close to legalized kidnaping in many instances, depriving parents of children if a white judge deemed it 'better for the habits and comfort' of a child to be bound out to a white guardian." Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long, p. 237.
-38-apprenticed out to their former owners. 84 As single parents, they were more likely to be found unsuitable providers for their children's needs, and therefore sought to get their male partners back in the house so that his income could be deemed available for the children's support.
Explaining the bastardy petitions is a bit more difficult. Given that there were so many of them filed, and that so few of them resulted in actual cash payments for child support, I suspect that one of the Northern Benevolent Aid societies conditioned the award of cash grants to needy children and mothers upon the respectability of the mother. The filing of bastardy petitions might have been incentivized by this private welfare regime. That is, complying with a legal ritual, even if it were nothing more than a formality, may have been enough to demonstrate the fact that the woman and her children were deserving according to the Protestant norms at work in Boston.
Thus, for freed men and women, marriage was constructed by the state as a site of freedom, a legally defined space in which legally defined subjects could exercise rights. Thus African Americans were caught in the double bind of freedom that Saidiya Hartman has termed "burdened individuality," whereby the granting of social and legal rights "resulted in the paradoxical construction of the freed both as self-determining and enormously burdened individuals and as members of a population whose productivity, procreation, and sexual practices were fiercely regulated and policed." 85 Here as elsewhere, Eve Sedgwick has likely provided a productive way to think about the rule of law and the role of law in freed men and women's lives: kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic. 86 From the state's perspective, however, the granting of marriage rights to African Americans in this period was part of a kind of political rationality that sought to produce a set of governing-effects largely grounded in a notion of habituating the freedmen to a project of self improvement and self governance. This kind of governance emanates not from violent or coercive acts by a primitive state on a passive body to be governed, but as an activity or practice that regulates the "conduct of conduct,"
that sets up a field of action for the governed. 87 The institutions of civil society, most prominently the family, should not, therefore, be understood as the binary opposite of the domain of the state, but rather are constructed as sites where social and civil subjects are called up in ways that can be organized and reorganized in ways that are useful to the state. These terrains are bounded by notions of freedom, consent and self-governance, and they oblige certain forms of conduct and forms of life to emerge. The glory of this form of governmentality is that the forms of conduct and life that are brought into being take 88 Rose, Powers of Freedom, p. 25. 89 Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, p. 34.
-40-place in "moral enclosures" that are understood to be expressions of individual freedom, consent and self-governance, not state coercion or violence.
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Marriage and the family, thus understood, were useful terrains on which to control and manage African Americans in the post civil war era. The freedom that the right to marry operationalized required them to internalize certain forms of sexual discipline and self government.
Indeed, freedom itself was made manifest in compliance with the disciplinary demands of marriage.
Thus, the political subject -the citizen -was the compliant freed man or woman who stood in contradistinction to the noncompliant legal subject -the fornicator, the adulterer, the bigamist. Here, as in the examples above, the interests of the many -the citizenry -took aim at the interests of the singular -the outlaw. Those who failed the tests that the inauguration of rights-bearing subjectivity implied found themselves on the opposite side of a fundamental political divide that had an explicit civilizing mission. Savage or citizen, the choice was the Freedmen's to make.
Those who failed the test because they clung to a different notion of what it meant to enjoy autonomy and liberty in one's intimate relations, found themselves legally caged (or chained in this case)
as dissenters from a norm to which they had chosen not to conform. Agency and discipline thus came packaged together in an era that made "unconventional sex a national threat and thus put a premium on managed sexuality for the health of the state."
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While the post-war U.S. government could have undertaken this project of freedom, submission and citizenship in a variety of ways, sexual discipline within the terrain of monogamous marriage was the first tactic they turned to. From the moment black people fled to the contraband camps, to the granting of the right to marry immediately after legal emancipation, to the prosecution of African American men for fornication and adultery, the regulation of African American sexuality and the performance of sexual discipline and self governance proved quite useful techniques of governance for the post bellum state. In this context, the regulation of sex proved to be of great service to both the practices of individual freedom and the practices of national reunification. As the U.S. government faced overwhelming challenges in bringing under its control the errant South as well as hundreds of thousands of freed men and women, sexual discipline and its structural frame -marriage -emerged quite quickly as an effective tool by which to manage this latter group.
Conclusion
I offer these three examples to show how in some circumstances it has proven useful to construct a narrative about the nation that contains an official national sexuality, and a nation that is populated by certain types of sexualized subjects and citizens. These examples illustrate how sexuality can help define political culture, and that certain forms of nationalism are operationalized through the management of threats that are easily imagined in sexualized terms. The epistemic violence of rule during dangerous times can be most effective when done through and by sex and sexuality. In all three examples, the dissenting, sexualized subject emerges from within the political and legal horizon created by the state. Thus, their origins and their social utility look quite different from that of the "ordinary" political dissenter.
